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Rachelle Sampson* & Yuan Shi**
INTRODUCTION
The rise in quarterly capitalism in corporate America—increased
pressure to meet quarterly earnings predictions and cater to shareholder
preferences for short-term returns—has gained significant coverage in the
business world and popular press in recent years.1 Increasingly, popular
opinion suggests that firms bow to shareholder pressures, taking steps to
smooth earnings and boost share prices in the short-term; firms do so by
cutting Research and Development (R&D) investment, engaging in
extensive cost-cutting, or increasing dividends and share buybacks.2 As
Laurence Fink notes:
[I]n the wake of the financial crisis, many companies have shied away
from investing in the future growth of their companies. Too
many companies have cut capital expenditure and even increased
debt to boost dividends and increase share buybacks . . . . [W]hen
done for the wrong reasons and at the expense of capital investment,
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1. See, e.g., Robert C. Pozen, Can We Break the Tyranny of Quarterly Results?, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Oct. 27, 2009), https://hbr.org/2009/10/can-we-break-the-tyranny-of-qu.html [https://perma.
cc/C9A2-4B7R]; James Surowiecki, The Short-Termism Myth, NEW YORKER (Aug. 24, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/24/the-short-termism-myth [https://perma.cc/Y3RXJVVV].
2. See Daniel Vasella & Clifton Leaf, “Temptation is All Around Us” Daniel Vasella of Novartis
Talks About Making the Numbers, Self-Deception, and the Danger of Craving Success, FORTUNE
(Nov. 18, 2002), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2002/11/18/332268/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/Q37R-J3GR]. For examples of empirical research confirming these
sentiments, see Brian J. Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment
Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305 (1998); John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate
Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (2004).
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[returning cash to shareholders] can jeopardize a company’s ability
to generate sustainable long-term returns. 3

These observations suggest that firms are engaged in behavior
intended to boost share prices in response to increasingly impatient
shareholders. Evaluating whether investor time horizons are, in fact,
shifting is of critical importance not only to firms but to the economy as a
whole. Short-termism has been called “one of the greatest threats to
America’s enduring prosperity.”4
Recent estimates at the industry level show that investor discount
rates have increased in recent years, supporting the notion that shorttermism is on the rise.5 However, we do not have evidence at the firm level
documenting whether and how market discounting is changing over time
or how such discounting differs between firms according to firm behavior
and characteristics. A recent article by Sampson and Shi estimates market
discounting at the firm level as a proxy for investor time horizons, which
not only reveals how time horizons have changed but also how they vary
between firms.6 Below, we discuss some observations on changing
investor behavior, followed by a review of the evidence presented by
Sampson and Shi. We conclude with a brief evaluation of why increased
market discounting suggests that investor time horizons are shortening as
well as what this means for firms.
I.

RECENT CHANGES IN INVESTOR IDENTITY AND BEHAVIOR

Investor characteristics appear to have changed significantly over the
past decades, both in terms of the identity of the investors themselves as
well as their behavior. Since 1950, a massive shift has taken place where
many institutional owners have replaced direct, retail holdings of shares;
in 1950, ninety-two percent of shares were held by individual investors,
and by 2006, that number had declined to thirty-two percent. Institutional
ownership climbed from eight percent to sixty-eight percent over the same
time period.7 At the same time, holding periods for shares collapsed from
3. Letter from Laurence D. Fink, Chairman & CEO, BlackRock, to Corporates (Mar. 21, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/blackrockletter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4ZWETW2R].
4. Joe Biden, How Short-Termism Saps the Economy, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/how-short-termism-saps-the-economy-1475018087.
5. See generally Richard Davies et al., Measuring the Cost of Short-Termism, J. FIN. STABILITY,
June 2014, at 16.
6. Rachelle C. Sampson & Yuan Shi, Are US Markets Becoming More Short-Term Oriented?
Evidence and Implications of Market Discounting of Firms, 1980-2013 (Working Paper, Oct. 1, 2017)
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2837524.
7. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 875 (2013); John C.
Bogle, Founder & Former Chairman, Vanguard Grp., Remarks at the Miller Center of Public Affairs
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the average of seven years in 19408 to seventeen weeks in 2015.9
Shortening holding periods will likely result in greater impatience for
returns; however, some institutional investors are more patient than others
and the effect of institutional investors on discounting may hinge on such
behavioral differences.
Bushee categorizes institutional investor behavior into three main
groups: dedicated (investors with concentrated holdings and low
turnover), transient (characterized by high turnover and diversification),
and quasi-indexers (widely diversified holdings but lower turnover).10
Higher turnover generally puts greater short-term pressure on firms.
Bushee shows that firms held by more transient institutional investors are
more likely to cut R&D spending in order to make earnings targets; this
translates into lower firm value in long-term earnings.11 In contrast, when
held by more dedicated institutional investors, firms are less likely to make
such cuts in spending to meet analyst expectations for earnings.12 Sampson
and Shi also report that the composition of institutional owners has
changed drastically over time: in 1981, dedicated and transient investors
each made up about fourteen percent of institutional owners, while in
2013, transient owners composed thirty-three percent of such investors
and dedicated owners constituted only three percent of such investors.13
These fundamental shifts in investor identity and behavior to favor
more short-term holdings have direct implications for firm behavior. Firm
executives are increasingly paid via stock-based compensation, the value
of which depends critically on share price. This is one of the most direct
mechanisms that investors can use to influence firm behavior and strategy.
Despite this identified link between investor preferences and firm
behavior, we lack a more direct measure of how markets discount firms
and whether this shows shifting investor time horizons. Sampson and Shi
identify such a measure, estimate the link with firm characteristics, and
discuss why such a measure captures investor time horizons.14
at the University of Virginia (Feb. 8, 2006), https://www.vanguard.com/bogle_site/sp20060208.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZXU9-D7R7].
8. Andy Haldane, Exec. Dir. Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Patience and Finance, Speech at the
Oxford China Business Forum in Beijing (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/
Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2010/speech445.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KPX-9DQD].
9. Jason Zweig, Why Hair-Trigger Traders Lose the Race, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2015), https://
blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/04/10/why-hair-trigger-stock-traders-lose-the-race/.
10. Bushee, supra note 2, at 305–33.
11. Brian J. Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run
Value?, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 207 (2001).
12. Id.
13. Quasi-indexers make up the remainder and represent the largest category of institutional
block holders at 64% in 2013, with uncategorized institutions taking up the balance. These statistics
do not appear in the working paper but are available upon request.
14. Sampson & Shi, supra note 6.
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ESTIMATING MARKET DISCOUNTING: A LINK WITH INVESTOR
TIME HORIZONS

To capture investor time horizons, Sampson and Shi adapt the market
discounting measure used by Davies and others.15 This measure is based
on a capital asset pricing model of stock prices, whereby stock price is
modeled as a function of expected future dividends and a terminal stock
price and discounted by variables capturing the cost of capital—
specifically, the risk-free interest rate and company-specific risk premium.
In essence, the measure is an evaluation of a stock as investment, assuming
(in the case of Sampson and Shi) that the stock is held for five years and
then sold at the end of the investment period. Traditional finance models
hold that present stock prices are not only a reflection of past firm
behavior, but expectations for the future in terms of dividends and stock
price appreciation. A market discount factor is added to this traditional
asset pricing model. If there is no additional discounting by the market
over and above the firm’s cost of capital, then the market discount factor
should be equal to one. Sampson and Shi estimate this market discount
factor using information on all firms listed on the New York Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ exchange over the years from 1980 to 2013
(inclusive).16 A non-linear random coefficient model is used in order to
generate firm-specific estimates of market discounting over time.
Sampson and Shi transform this variable postestimation so that higher
values represent greater market discounting of firms.17
Results from this estimation display several striking trends. First,
market discounting shows some volatility over time, particularly around
market-wide financial shocks such as the dot-com bubble and financial
crisis of 2007–2008. Market discounting also demonstrates an
unequivocal rise over time. Several alternative measures and robustness
checks confirm this trend. To ensure that this rise is not simply an artifact
of shifting composition of listed firms on the U.S. stock exchanges,
Sampson and Shi also graph within firm movement of market discounting
over time;18 this graph reveals that market discounting not only increased
market-wide over 1980 to 2013 but also increased within firms for the vast
majority of the sample.19
An examination of market discounting across industries reveals
similar patterns, but interestingly also reveals significant between-firm

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.

2018]

Are Investor Time Horizons Shortening?

547

heterogeneity.20 To explore this heterogeneity and corroborate market
discounting as a proxy for time horizons, Sampson and Shi estimate the
relationship between a firm’s discount by the market and that firm’s
behavior and characteristics.21 Specifically, the market discount is
regressed on measures capturing past firm investment behavior, ownership
by different types of institutional investors, and other measures capturing
the market’s short-term pressures on firms.22 These measures represent
proxies identified by earlier research that are correlated with firm
investment horizons and behavior.
Results from Sampson and Shi’s estimation show that market
discounting is strongly correlated in expected ways with these variables.23
Firm investments in research and development as well as capital
equipment are typically characterized by longer-term payoffs and, thus,
signal a more distant investment horizon. Consistent with this logic, such
investments are negatively correlated with market discounting.24 In
contrast, a firm’s market discount is positively correlated with its transient
institutional investor holdings, but negatively correlated with its dedicated
holdings. These results are as projected: institutional owners that hold
shares for longer periods of time place less pressure on firms to generate
short-term returns. Other previously identified measures to capture
external pressures on firms to generate short-term returns include the
extent of analyst coverage, the threat of shareholder activism, and the
firm’s earnings response coefficient (i.e., how responsive the firm’s stock
price is to earnings announcements). These variables are all positively
correlated with a firm’s market discount, as anticipated. Overall, Sampson
and Shi interpret these consistent correlations as evidence that market
discounting does embody time horizons.25
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF SHORTENING INVESTOR TIME HORIZONS

As previously discussed, market discounting reflects past firm
behavior and future expectations for performance, as well as preferences
around firm actions. Sampson and Shi highlight a number of firm
examples to illustrate this point. Some firms, such as Ericsson, are heavily
discounted by the market for R&D investments of a type that are
disapproved of by analysts; these analysts opined that Ericsson was “doing

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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too many things” and was spread too thin.26 Microsoft, in contrast, also
invested significant sums in R&D but was much less discounted by the
markets.27 Several other examples demonstrate how market discounting
encompasses investor preferences for firm behavior. While these
anecdotes explain firm heterogeneity in market discounting, they do not
explain the market-wide trends.
Sampson and Shi also propose several systemic, market-wide factors
that affect how investors discount firms.28 These factors are likely linked
to rising uncertainty and compressed cycles of investment and production
in the market, resulting from increased firm exposure to globalization,
rapid technological change, and market-wide financial shocks. In light of
these overall trends, it may be rational for investors to prefer short-term
returns over more uncertain, longer-term payoffs. However, given the
ability of investors to pressure firms via influence over share price, it
becomes critically important that investor time horizons match what is
optimal for firms.
Empirical evidence reveals the issues that arise when firms bow to
market pressures. Survey-based and larger-scale empirical evidence from
other studies show that managers will forgo profitable investments29 and
cut R&D30 to smooth earnings. Firms may invest less in durables when
they have extensive analyst coverage, which makes stock prices more
volatile and responsive to news.31 If investment options are not transparent
to the market, firms have been found to cater to shareholder preferences
and invest suboptimally.32 Firms have also failed to make necessary
investments in response to industry technological shifts in order to
conform to analyst expectations.33
The research above highlights that, for some firms, rising investor
impatience can lead to suboptimal firm investment. However, for other
firms, pressure to generate short-term returns is an important discipline to

26. Stephen D. Moore, Ericsson Seeks to Calm Investors’ Jitters—CEO Aims to Balance
Research, Profit Needs, WALL ST. J. (EUROPE EDITION) (Nov. 26, 1993).
27. Sampson & Shi, supra note 6.
28. Id.
29. See generally Graham et al., supra note 2.
30. Bushee, supra note 2.
31. Mark R. DesJardine, Under Pressure: The Causal Effect of Financial Analyst Coverage on
Long-Term Capital Investments, (Aug. 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2650729.
32. See generally Christopher Polk & Paola Sapienza, The Stock Market and Corporate
Investment: A Test of Catering Theory, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 187 (2009), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.366.6099&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/9CUF-MPMM].
33. See generally Mary J. Benner & Ram Ranganathan, Measuring Up? Persistence and Change
in Analysts’ Evaluative Schemas Following Technical Change, 28 ORG. SCI. 760 (2017).
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constrain the firm from unprofitable and opportunistic investments.34 The
question then becomes how to evaluate the market-wide upward shift in
discounting identified by Sampson and Shi. Since Sampson and Shi
observe that market discounting is increasing for the vast majority of firms
listed on U.S. stock exchanges, it seems likely that, for at least some firms,
an appropriate match between investor and firm investment time horizons
will not be had. This may lead not only to potential underinvestment in
critical factors for firm and economic growth, but also to changes in the
character of investment, where, for example, firms outsource research
instead of conduct research in-house. This outsourcing behavior has
proved less beneficial to the firm than internally conducted research and
development in terms of contributions to firm productivity.35
CONCLUSIONS
Sampson and Shi demonstrate (via numerous empirical tests) that
market discounting is rising—a signal that investor time horizons are
indeed shrinking. These results have been highlighted in recent debates on
the extent to which short-termism exists36 and how it affects the
economy.37 While interpreting shortening investor time horizons as
detrimental to all firms is overly simplistic, Sampson and Shi’s analysis
reveals that shrinking time horizons are so ubiquitous in the financial
market that they warrant questions over whether public firms are facing
undue pressures to generate short-term returns.38
The results presented may help explain declining research and
development productivity39 as well as stagnant total factor productivity
growth.40 Concurrent shortening of investor time horizons suggests, in
part, that underlying these trends is under-investment or otherwise
suboptimal investment by firms; this can include reduced investments in
worker training, new manufacturing equipment, and development of the
34. See John Asker et al., Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?, 28 REV.
FIN. STUD. 342 (2015) (evidencing that publicly listed firms invest less and are less sensitive to
investment opportunities than their private counterparts).
35. Anne Marie Knott, Outsourced R&D and GDP Growth (Ctr. for Econ. Studs., Working Paper
No. 16-19, 2016), http://3we057434eye2lrosr3dcshy.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/07/Outsourced-RD-and-GDP-growth.pdf [https://perma.cc/56CP-JG82].
36. Tyler Cowen, Maybe Companies Aren’t Too Focused on the Short Term, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
7, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-10-07/maybe-companies-aren-ttoo-focused-on-the-short-term.
37. Rachelle C. Sampson, Short-Term Thinking in Corporate America is Strangling the
Economy, VOX (Oct. 3, 2016, 10:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/10/3/13141852/
short-term-capitalism-clinton-economics [https://perma.cc/49RG-BHVG].
38. Sampson & Shi, supra note 6.
39. See generally Knott, supra note 35.
40. Total factor productivity captures the combined productivity for capital and labor. Total
factor productivity growth from 1980 to 2013 is shown in Sampson & Shi, supra note 6.

550

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 41:543

next great product or service that will generate returns for years to come.
The implications are difficult to understate since productivity undergirds
economic growth and standards of living. As such, Galston and Kamarck
argue that “[a]s the growth of the U.S. workforce slows dramatically,
economic growth will depend increasingly on improved productivity,
most of which comes from raising capital investment per worker. Failing
to make productivity-enhancing capital investments will doom our
economy to a new normal of slow growth.”41
Ultimately, Sampson and Shi provide one of the first market-wide
assessments of firm level discounting with direct implications for investor
time horizons. Naturally, additional work across disciplines is required to
triangulate this pattern and to offer richer context for understanding the
full implications. By documenting and corroborating such a persistent
trend in investment horizons, we hope to engage academic researchers,
business leaders, and policymakers in broader dialogues on why our
concept of time is changing and what the implications for our economy
may be.

41. William A. Galston & Elaine Kamarck, More Builders and Fewer Traders: A Growth
Strategy for the American Economy, BROOKINGS (June 1, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/CEPMGlastonKarmarck4.pdf [https://perma.cc/2REN-RRKF].

